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A COLLABORATION OVER TIME
Alexander McCall Smith*
NE of the great strengths of Dan Shuman as a scholar was his
ability to bring to bear, on the problems he addressed, a wide
and wise understanding of the world. The view of legal scholar-
ship as being narrow, and indeed dry, is a thoroughly misleading one:
legal scholarship is full of the human drama in all its forms. This is espe-
cially true when it embraces-as it did in Dan Shuman's work-the in-
sights of another discipline, in his case that of psychology.
My collaboration with Dan Shuman began in the first of the two im-
mensely stimulating and rewarding periods I spent as a visiting professor
at the SMU Dedman School of Law. Our shared academic interest was
the relationship between medicine and the law, but we soon discovered
that we were both interested in the same aspects of torts and criminal
law. I did not have Dan's knowledge of psychology, and to me that pro-
vided a fascinating additional element in the conversations that we en-
joyed over a wide range of legal topics. These conversations were always
such a pleasure, as Dan had a great ability to lead a discussion forward by
asking just the right question and always listening courteously to the an-
swer. That is a great art, and it was, I think, one of the qualities that set
him aside as a particularly fine adornment to legal academia.
We started to talk about time. There may have been some particular
development that triggered this discussion, but if there was, I cannot re-
call it. But gradually the focus of our interest became that of the effect
that the passage of time has on guilt and legal liability. That issue had
long been of interest to me, and I had given it considerable thought, but
what had been lacking in my own consideration of the issue was the spe-
cifically psychological questions that arose in this context. Dan's wide
reading in psychology and his long involvement in that discipline brought
a whole new dimension to an issue that I had been considering from a
philosophical and legal perspective.
My interest in the subject had initially been aroused by the question of
the political use made of history. My first university position had been in
the Faculty of Law of the Queen's University of Belfast, at a time when
the conflict that Northern Ireland recently endured was just beginning.
Of course in one sense it had begun a long time before that: the roots of
that particular dispute are centuries deep. What interested me, though,
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was the extent to which those I met on both sides of the argument fo-
cused on what had happened in the past-and sometimes in the rather
distant past. The wrongs of that past-and they were indisputable-were
constantly brought up in conversation, polished, and displayed. In many
respects, the conflict then became one about past injustice rather than
about future resolution.
This interested me, and I began to look more seriously at other exam-
ples of the political uses of history. The problem is not a simple one: we
have to remember what happened in the past or as the adage warns, we
shall be doomed to repeat it. That is undoubtedly true: we should not
forget, for example, what happened in Europe in the 1930s, or it could
conceivably happen again. And the same must be said for any of the
distressing episodes that have marred human history. Not only does the
past explain what we are today-it warns.
And yet there must come a time at which we decide to put the past to
bed, to consign it to a different category of history, and to stop using
particular past events as bargaining chips or arguments in our current
lives. The case of Ireland provides a good example for that. As part of
the peace process that has brought and end to the conflict in Northern
Ireland, both sides had to make a conscious effort to forget past wrongs
and to look forward -rather than backward. That both sides have shown
themselves capable of doing this has been remarkable and must surely
encourage others trapped in similar conflicts to escape the endless blood
feuds that can result from invoking the memory of past atrocities and
injustices.
This issue, of course, has broader implications. Not only does it affect
actual conflicts, it has a bearing on the way in which states deal with
problems of justice as between groups. One of the striking features of
state conduct in the late twentieth century was the way in which various
countries looked at the economic and social residue of past injustice. A
willingness to confront what was done in the past and then to apologize
for it led to gestures of historical redress, as has happened, for instance, in
Australia. There the authorities have been willing to address the issue of
what was done to the aboriginal communities by European settlers and to
make amends for that. That has had a positive healing effect and has, in
the view of many, enabled Australia to look its past in the eye.
Those major historical issues are one side of the issue; another impor-
tant dimension is that of the way in which the passage of time affects
individual guilt and, in a specifically legal context, liability. This was the
issue that Dan Shuman and I decided to explore in the book Justice and
the Prosecution of Old Crimes that we worked on for two years before its
publication by the American Psychological Association in 2000.1 What
effect should the passage of time have on the prosecution of crime?
1. DANIEL W. SHUMAN & ALEXANDER MCCALL SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE PROSECU-
TION OF OLD CRIMES: BALANCING LEGAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND MORAL CONCERNS
(2000).
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Should there be a period after which criminal proceedings should not be
undertaken-the statute of limitations approach-or should criminal lia-
bility persist no matter how long ago a crime was committed?
This question proved to be somewhat complicated. An easy answer is
to impose a time limit for the bringing of prosecution; this, of course,
being the solution that many jurisdictions adopt. That, at least, settles the
matter legally. If it is too late to mount a prosecution, then the criminal
justice system must ignore what happened. That solution, though, even if
it has the advantages of certainty, invites examination. Is it sufficiently
sensitive to the needs of the victim of the crime in question? Why does
criminal liability cease simply because time has elapsed? Is it because of
the difficulties in dealing with old cases-staleness of evidence and so
on-or is it because we believe that somehow there is a time limit to guilt:
that should not be accountable for old wrongs simply because they are
old?
Our examination took us down many byways. We debated memory
and its reliability-and here Dan's expertise in the sufficiency of memory
and its tricks was particularly valuable. We looked at the issue of per-
sonal identity, with its intriguing possibilities of renewal of self. This is an
issue of great interest to philosophers: are we the same person today as
we were, say, twenty years ago? Obviously there will be cases in which
people change so profoundly as to be unrecognizable-not just physi-
cally. It is at least arguable that what such persons did before they
changed should not be attributable to the "new person." Many of us
would accept that this should apply in respect of what we did as young
children: the decisions and actions of the eight-year-old boy surely should
not be visited upon the thirty-year-old man that boy has become. Other
changes in self, however, are not so clear-cut, and these changes involve
important philosophical and practical considerations about the need for
some notion of the continuity in personal identity. I cannot reinvent my-
self to escape the consequences of my actions: our whole system of rela-
tions in society would shudder to a halt if we allowed that. At that same
time, it seems unrealistic to insist that the self cannot be radically differ-
ent at various points in its existence.
The more that Dan Shuman and I delved into these issues, the more we
found ourselves confronted with the basic moral problems of forgiveness.
The criminal law tends not to deal directly with forgiveness, even if the
need for forgiveness is apparent in some of its assumptions. A statute of
limitations approach, with its arbitrary time limits on prosecution, may be
analyzed in terms of forgiveness. Insofar as such a statute requires an
issue to be dropped, it may be seen as implicitly signaling that there
comes a point at which the victim-and possibly the state-should for-
give the wrong that has been done. Defenders of the limitations ap-
proach may not put it that way-they may explain the approach more in
terms of the need to save the criminal justice system form being cluttered
up with old business-but in that a limitations approach seems to strike
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many as being essentially sensible, that might well be because forgiveness
seems sensible to most people.
Since the publication of the book, there have continued to be cases in
which the issues it addresses have been raised. In my own jurisdiction,
Scotland, we have no statute of limitations, and prosecutions can con-
tinue in respect of offenses committed twenty or thirty years ago. When
those offenses involve homicide, it seems entirely right that there should
be a prosecution (and indeed most statutes of limitation exclude murder).
When the offense is a lesser one, it is more questionable whether criminal
proceedings should be brought. For the most part, the old offenses that
are brought to court are sexual offenses, frequently those committed
against young victims. These offenses are usually particularly distressing,
with psychological consequences that can persist for a longer period of
time than is the case with non-sexual assaults. Deciding whether it is in
the public interest to pursue such matters after many decades is a difficult
matter: the interest that the victim has in seeing the offender brought to
justice must be balanced against the apparent harshness of convicting an
aged offender for something that he did as a young man. In one Scottish
case of this type, the offender could not recall the event it was so long
ago-a claim that seemed genuine enough given that he did not contest
the victim's version of it and pleaded guilty. That raises interesting ques-
tions about the point of convicting a person for that which he or she can-
not remember. Strict justice may require this, but does such a conviction
serve any other purpose?
Even if the criminal law is concerned only incidentally with it, forgive-
ness should play a central part in our lives. Forgiveness has the potential
to deprive the past of its ability to poison the present. The blame culture,
that seeks to find a cause for every misfortune or setback, leads to a cli-
mate of recrimination and bitterness. Forgiveness is the antithesis of that.
The days spent with Dan Shuman thinking and writing about these is-
sues of time and its effect constituted one of the most rewarding exper-
iences of my career. But that was what it was like, I believe, for so many
who were associated with him, as colleague, as teacher, or simply as
friend. And time, I think, will in this case at least be slow to dull those
memories.
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